Stranlund

JOHN K. STRANLUND

Curriculum Vita February, 2008 JOHN K. STRANLUND CONTACT Department of Resource Economics (413) 545 - 6328 (phone) 214 Stockbridge Hall (413) 545 - 6328 (fax) University of Massachusetts stranlund@resecon.umass.edu 80 Campus Center Way http://www.umass.edu/resec/faculty/stranlund/ Amherst, MA ...

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An Experiment on Enforcement Strategies for Managing a Local ...

This experiment is a classroom adaptation of field experiments run by Cardenas, Stranlund, and Willis (2000) with rural villagers in Colombia, ...

faculty.cbpp.uaa.alaska.edu

Resource Economics 263 Professor John Stranlund

1 Resource Economics 263 Professor John Stranlund Natural Resource Economics Fall 2010 Course Homepage: http://courses.umass.edu/resec263/index.shtml Resource Economics 263 is an introductory class in natural resource economics.

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Economic inequality and burden-sharing in the provision of ...

Ecological Economics 40 (2002) 379-395 ANALYSIS Economic inequality and burden-sharing in the provision of local environmental quality Juan CamiloCardena s a, John Stranlund b, *, Cleve Willis c a Facultadde Estudios Ambientalesy Rurales , Uniersidad Jaeriana , Trans 4 c 42-00 ( Piso 8) , Bogota ...

karlan.yale.edu

Local Environmental Control and Institutional Crowding-Out

Local Environmental Control and Institutional Crowding-Out JUAN CAMILOCARDENAS Universidad Javeriana, Bogota, Colombia JOHNSTRANLUND University of Massachusetts, Amherst, USA and CLEVEWILLIS * University of Massachusetts, Amherst, USA Summary.

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JAMES J. MURPHY

James J. Murphy April 2011 2 R ESEARCH P APERS AND P RESENTATIONS Peer-Reviewed Journal Articles Stranlund, John K., James J. Murphy and John M. Spraggon.

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Enforcing Emissions Trading when Emissions Permits are ...

Using linear penalties in the Stranlund and Chavezmodelwould yield a result identical to the one we derive for the last period of our dynamic model in which we conclude that the permit violation penalty cannot be used to conserve monitoring costs.

fiesta.bren.ucsb.edu

THE CHOICE OF POLICY INSTRUMENTS TO CONTROL POLLUTION UNDER ...

Journal of Applied Economics. Vol XII, No. 2 (November 2009), 207-227 THE CHOICE OF POLICY INSTRUMENTS TO CONTROL POLLUTION UNDER COSTLY ENFORCEMENT AND INCOMPLETE INFORMATION Carlos A. Chávez* Universidad de Concepción Mauricio G. Villena Universidad Adolfo Ibáñez John K. Stranlund ...

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Can Affirmative Motivations Improve Compliance in Emissions ...

We are grateful for valuable comments provided by Lata Gangadharan, Jim Murphy, Steve Rassenti, John Stranlund, and participants at the Midwest Political Science Association 2009 annual meeting and Northeastern Agricultural and Research Economics Association 2009 Workshop on Experimental Methods.

www.krannert.purdue.edu

University of Massachusetts Amherst

University of Massachusetts Amherst Department of Resource Economics Working Paper No. 2007-9 http://www.umass.edu/resec/workingpapers Bankruptcy Risk and the Performance of Tradable Permit Markets John K. Stranlund 1 and Wei Zhang 2 Abstract: We study the impact of bankruptcy risk on markets ...

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